Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and  Defense by Van Alstyne, William W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media Faculty and Deans
1971
Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense"
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1971 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media
Repository Citation









William Van Alstyne 
I. Introduction 
In the wake of student unrest and in the presence of 
strong competition for the diversion of funds to other 
national priorities, severe demands are now being made 
for greater professional accountability and for greater 
efficiency in higher education. Unsurprisingly, tenure has 
been singled out as an obstacle to both of these goals and, 
consequently, as a blockade to educational progress. 
Simultaneously, the felt dissatisfaction with the general 
adequacy of teaching has renewed the common suspicion 
that tenure is a professional masquerade: that it lingers 
as a sophistical phrase obscuring the dark reality of 
uniquely selfish claims of a right to lifetime employment 
for the incompetent and irresponsible. 
Older members of the profession may well be inclined 
to shrug off these critical suggestions, having heard them 
more than once before and remembering the careful 
answers that ably replied to them. (It is in fact quite true 
that the issue has been joined many times, i.e., that the 
concept of tenure has never been allowed to pass unex- 
amined, simply as part of the conventional wisdom.) 
Nevertheless, even if it is true that little new can possibly 
be said on the subject, some brief reconsideration may 
serve at least to rekindle a livelier understanding of a vital 
concept which has tended of late to suffer from a harden- 
ing of the categories. 
In this small essay, I mean hardly to offer a "defense" 
of tenure at all. Rather, given the presuppositious char- 
acter of criticism so recently heaped upon it, tenure's best 
defense may well inhere simply in a clear statement of 
what it is - and what it is not. In what follows, I believe 
that the statements about tenure are fully responsive to the 
applicable principles and standards supported by AAUP, 
although there is certainly nothing more authoritative 
about my views in this regard than those of others to 
whom the Bulletin freely extends the courtesy of its pages. 
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE is Professor of Law at Duke 
University. He is the immediate past General Counsel of 
the AAUP and is currently Chairman of Committee A on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure. 
II. A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense" 
Tenure, accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no 
claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment. 
Rather, tenure provides only that no person continuously 
retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified 
lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be 
dismissed without adequate cause. Moreover, the par- 
ticular standards of "adequate cause" to which the tenured 
faculty is accountable are themselves wholly within the 
prerogative of each university to determine through its 
own published rules, save only that those rules not be 
applied in a manner which violates the academic freedom 
or the ordinary personal civil liberties of the individual. 
An institution may provide for dismissal for "adequate 
cause" arising from failure to meet a specified norm of 
performance or productivity, as well as from specified acts 
of affirmative misconduct. In short, there is not now and 
never has been a claim that tenure insulates any faculty 
member from a fair accounting of his professional respon- 
sibilities within the institution which counts upon his 
service. 
In a practical sense, tenure is translatable principally as 
a statement of formal assurance that thereafter the indi- 
vidual's professional security and academic freedom will 
not be placed in question without the observance of full 
academic due process. This accompanying complement 
of academic due process merely establishes that a fairly 
rigorous procedure will be observed whenever formal 
complaint is made that dismissal is justified on some stated 
ground of professional irresponsibility, to insure the fair 
determination of three facts: 
1. that the stated cause is the authentic cause for dis- 
missal, rather than a pretense or makeweight for considera- 
tions invading the academic freedom or ordinary personal 
civil liberties of the individual; 
2. that the stated cause exists in fact; 
3. that the degree of demonstrated professional irre- 
sponsibility warrants outright termination of the indi- 
vidual's appointment rather than some lesser sanction, even 
after taking into account the balance of his entire service 
and the personal consequences of dismissal. 
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In all of these respects, the procedural protections of 
tenure are analogous to fair hearing requirements even 
now evolving in the federal courts for the protection of 
various kinds of status in the public sector (including 
employment), to the statutory procedural protection of 
civil servants, and to the grievance procedures conven- 
tional in collective bargaining agreements. It has long 
since ceased to be true that even relatively unskilled 
workers in an industrial firm may be summarily fired by 
unilateral decision of management; statutory law limits 
the grounds for dismissal, recourse to the National Labor 
Relations Board is available for reinstatement and back 
pay under appropriate circumstances, and the contract 
itself ordinarily provides for a grievance procedure for 
review and arbitration of the proposed discharge. (Tenure 
- through its reference to more specific and rigorous 
forms of academic due process - usually does provide, 
however, a larger measure of procedural protection than 
is provided in the ex post facto review of the factory 
worker's grievance.) 
Tenure may also be stated in the following way more 
clearly to indicate its basis and meaning. The conferral 
of tenure means that the institution, after utilizing a pro- 
bationary period of as long as six years in which it has 
had ample opportunity to determine the professional com- 
petence and responsibility of its appointees, has rendered 
a favorable judgment establishing a rebuttable presump- 
tion of the individual's professional excellence. As the 
lengthy term of probationary service will have provided 
the institution with sufficient experience to determine 
whether the faculty member is worthy of a presumption 
of professional fitness, it has not seemed unreasonable to 
shift to the individual the benefit of doubt when the insti- 
tution thereafter extends his service beyond the period of 
probation and, correspondingly, to shift to the institution 
the obligation fairly to show why, if at all, that faculty 
member should nonetheless be fired. The presumption of 
the tenured faculty member's professional excellence thus 
remains rebuttable, exactly to the extent that when it can 
be shown that the individual possessing tenure has none- 
theless fallen short or has otherwise misconducted himself 
as determined according to full academic due process, the 
presumption is lost and the individual is subject to dis- 
missal. 
There are, moreover, certain circumstances in which 
tenure will not provide even this degree of professional 
security for faculty members of unquestioned excellence. 
Two of these circumstances may appropriately be speci- 
fied to indicate further how utterly false is the claim that 
tenure would rather suffer hardship to an entire institution 
than hardship to any of its tenured staff. As many faculty 
members are painfully aware, declining student enroll- 
ments in certain academic departments not only have oc- 
curred with such suddenness as to raise a serious question 
of whether the decline is really a healthy turning away 
from less worthwhile subjects (rather than a simple turn 
of fashion), but have also precipitously reduced the de- 
mand for the services of some faculty members with par- 
ticular skills in those departments. Nevertheless, assum- 
ing that each of the affected faculty members, even 
though he possesses tenure, is either unable or unwilling 
to retrain and equip himself to be professionally com- 
petent in some other area of the academic program with 
sufficient demand to sustain his employment within the 
institution, his services may be terminated simply by the 
cessation of the program itself. While the faculty appro- 
priately must participate in any decision concerning the 
reduction or elimination of a given program for the same 
reason that it must do so when the enlargement or addi- 
tion of a program may be contemplated, viz., to provide 
some informed judgment about the educational wisdom 
of the proposed programmatic change, tenure provides no 
guarantee against becoming a casualty to institutional 
change. 
Again, the termination of particular academic programs, 
not from failure of interest by students but from unavoid- 
able conditions of financial stringency, carries with it no 
suggestion that the released members of the faculty have 
either fallen short in their duties or otherwise miscon- 
ducted themselves in a manner warranting termination. 
Nonetheless, if there is an authentic financial emergency 
confronting the university, and if decisions concerning 
what programs must be terminated and in what order, 
what particular faculty members must be released and in 
what sequence - if these decisions are made in a nonarbi- 
trary and reasonable way with appropriate faculty partic- 
ipation, then nothing at all will insulate adversely affected 
individuals from the hard prospect of unemployment. 
Tenure, then, neither buttons up the process of institu- 
tional change nor binds the ways which each institution 
must consider as it copes with authentic financial distress. 
It is but a limited statement that each faculty member 
possessing it, receiving it only after a stipulated period of 
probationary service, is thought worthy of a rebuttable 
presumption of professional excellence in continuing 
service to the institution. Thereafter, when termination 
of his services is sought for any reason inconsistent with 
that presumption, it requires only that the burden of 
justification be fairly discharged under conditions of aca- 
demic due process by those with whom it properly rests. 
To the extent that tenure protections of full academic 
due process possess a marked resemblance to the pro- 
cedural rights of others not involved in higher education, 
it is clear that tenure does contemplate an interest in 
professional security quite apart from its central objective 
to safeguard academic freedom. There is, moreover, 
every good reason that it should do so entirely aside from 
an intelligent concern to render higher education com- 
petitive with other employment opportunities by assuring 
that it provides at least as much job security. The more 
fundamental reason for the requirement of due process 
here as elsewhere is the desire to do justice and to avoid 
errors in the making of critical judgments. Even sup- 
posing that in many instances a particular charge of pro- 
fessional irresponsibility is neither stated in terms which 
anyone would claim to raise a question of academic free- 
don (e.g., a charge that a faculty member has accepted 
bribes in the award of grades) nor that the charge is 
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otherwise suspected of having been brought forward 
solely from an ulterior reason which itself relates to aca- 
demic freedom, still the need would remain to protect the 
individual from unreasonable risks of error and prejudice 
in the resolution of that charge. The power to fire a 
person without a fair hearing - in this instance a hearing 
according to academic due process - deserves to be called 
"arbitrary" and to be despised, not so much on its own 
account as on account of its greater tendency to result 
in error - to yield a result utterly at odds with what we 
would have desired had the actual facts been known. 
On such a basis, we find no difficulty in understanding 
why an individual may not be made even to pay a fine for 
drunk driving in the absence of a right to fair trial which 
yields a civilized assurance that he did in fact violate the 
law. Protection of a professor from the unjust forfeiture 
of his position after a long period of service to the insti- 
tution is surely as simple a thing to understand, and thus 
the appropriateness of furnishing that protection through 
the assurance of academic due process without regard to 
the nature of the charge. 
Nevertheless, beyond the consideration of justice itself, 
it is still extremely important to understand the special 
relationship of tenure to academic freedom in particular. 
An understanding of this relationship would be worthwhile 
in any case, given the fact that the vast majority of con- 
tested dismissals continue to involve disputes over whether 
what the individual may have done is part of his academic 
freedom (e.g., how he discharges his duties, what he has 
said about the college, whether his extramural utterances 
are defensible within his discipline), and many others have 
arisen under circumstances involving the suspicion of 
ulterior purpose in bringing the charge - a purpose itself 
believed to violate academic freedom. Essentially, how- 
ever, the connection of tenure with academic freedom is 
important to understand so as to account for the particular 
form of due process to which tenure creates an entitle- 
ment, namely, full academic due process with its em- 
phasis upon professional peer-group participation in the 
first instance. 
The function of tenure is not only to encourage the 
development of specialized learning and professional 
expertise by providing a reasonable assurance against the 
dispiriting risk of summary termination; it is to maximize 
the freedom of the professional scholar and teacher to 
benefit society through the innovation and dissemination 
of perspectives and discoveries aided by his investiga- 
tions, without fear that he must accommodate his honest 
perspectives to the conventional wisdom. The point is 
as old as Galileo and, indeed, as new as Arthur Jensen. 
An individual who is subject to termination without 
showing of professional irresponsibility, irrespective of 
the long term of his service within his discipline, will 
to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own per- 
spectives and take from all of us that which we might 
more usefully confront and consider. Exactly as his skill 
and understanding advance to a point making it more 
likely than before that he will contribute something to the 
legacy of past endeavors, exactly as he will have made 
an extended commitment in one given discipline diminish- 
ing his opportunities to do something else with his life or 
to start all over again in a wholly different kind of career, 
so the larger society will tend to be deprived of whatever 
he would have had to offer it by the very degree of 
chilling inhibition which it would impose through up- 
holding institutional authority to dismiss him without full 
academic due process. It is the most vital function of 
tenure to avoid this contingency by shifting the benefit of 
doubt to the individual, entitling him then to full aca- 
demic due process. 
The shift does, indeed, do more than to provide a fair 
hearing in the usual sense, i.e., a full hearing before disin- 
terested parties, preceded by a statement of specific 
charges based upon reasonably clear standards. Rather, 
full academic due process locates the fulcrum of respon- 
sibility to determine in the first instance whether the 
tenured professor's work is professionally defensible in 
those with whom the risk of abuse may least dangerously 
be placed, namely, his professional peers. 
The matter can be fairly expressed only in this way 
(i.e., "with whom the risk of abuse may least dangerously 
be placed"), for it is true of course that there are degrees 
of intolerance and convention regarding the methodology 
and premises of "professionally responsible" utterances 
within academic peer groups as outside of them. Faculty 
committees are doubtless capable of reacting against a 
colleague when others would not have done so, or of 
favoring him when others would not have done so, and 
either of these may be accomplished on occasion by 
means against which no system can be 100 per cent fool- 
proof. Given the necessary decision that there must be 
accountability somewhere, according to some standard, as 
initially reviewed by some group of human beings, how- 
ever, the alternatives to initial peer-group hearing all seem 
worse where academic freedom tends so frequently to be 
at stake. At the same time, the entitlement of tenure to 
full academic due process with its emphasis upon initial 
peer-group hearing is not without significant checks and 
balances and by no means reposes final adjudicative au- 
thority within the faculty. Rather, it is characteristically 
hedged about by the reserved authority of the university 
president and trustees to reverse a judgment or to modify 
a sanction either favoring or disfavoring the individual, 
for compelling reasons and following fair review with 
him and with the faculty committee which initially con- 
sidered the case.1 
The sense and system of tenure, in summary, come 
down to this. After completing the full profile of profes- 
sional preparation, an individual appointed to the faculty 
of an institution for the first time is neither assured of 
1 A better alternative to this system is by no means obvious. 
Indeed, a number of alternatives were canvassed again early 
this year, in a comprehensive report at the University of Utah, 
by a Commission including among its members students and 
citizens from outside the institution. Two-thirds through that Commission's Report (the text of which appears elsewhere in 
this issue), the first recommendation appears: 
Recommendation No. 1: The tenure system at the 
University of Utah should be maintained. 
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lifetime employment, nor is he assured of employment 
beyond the initial term on some general condition of good 
behavior, nor is he even presumed to be professionally 
excellent according to the institution's own standards of 
faculty excellence. Rather, the immediate premise of his 
appointment is extremely limited, i.e., that he is appointed 
because he appears to be attractive and to meet certain 
needs better than others at the time, with only the assur- 
ance that he will not be fired without cause during the 
specified term of his initial appointment and that he will 
be given a fair chance to establish his excellence over a 
period of six years assuming, further, that the institution 
does not in the meantime find others whom it thinks may 
show greater promise or otherwise better meet its needs 
then he. If the institution so resolves its policy clearly, 
to "play the field" and to displace a nontenured appointee 
by appointing someone else it subsequently finds has 
become available and whom it regards as more attractive, 
it is free to do so at least if it has fairly articulated this 
prerogative and provides notice of and intention to exer- 
cise it, reasonably in advance of the end of a given proba- 
tionary term. 
Even assuming the necessity of this sort of rugged com- 
petition arrangement to assure each institution of flexi- 
bility of choice and an opportunity to resolve the excel- 
lence of its newer staff, however, it is surely clear that 
six years of experience with the faculty member's full- 
time professional service will provide the institution with 
ample opportunity to judge his fitness according to the 
standards and means of review it has established. The 
institution thus may not further postpone resolving 
whether that faculty member is now worthy of a condi- 
tional statement of continuing confidence, given the 
intrinsic unfairness of an ever-increasing degree of spe- 
cialization and dependence on his part under circum- 
stances where a qualified judgment respecting his fitness is 
clearly feasible and where a failure to resolve that judg- 
ment must continue to trammel both his personal security 
and his academic freedom. 
Indeed, throughout his probationary terms of service 
the academic freedom of the appointee will necessarily 
have been more constrained than that of others, given the 
fact that he has continued to face the prospect of non- 
renewal without a demonstration of adequate cause pur- 
suant to full academic due process. The degree of damp- 
ening effect upon his academic and personal freedom has 
been justifiable during this time, moreover, solely on the 
basis that an initial appointment with "instant tenure" 
would have been premature and reckless, i.e., it would 
have expressed a statement of confidence in the demon- 
strated excellence of the appointee when no such state- 
ment could intelligently be made in the absence of a 
reasonable opportunity to determine whether it is 
warranted. 
Temporizing beyond six years of experience can 
scarcely be rationalized on such a basis, however, and 
thus the institution is fairly called upon carefully to decide 
by that time whether a conditional statement of continu- 
ing confidence is warranted - a statement of tenure. If, 
upon adequate consideration, the conclusion is reached 
that no such statement is in fact warranted, the institution 
must so advise him and put an end to uncertainty by 
making the seventh year terminal. Otherwise, it must 
extend to him the benefit of the doubt for the first time, 
equally ending the uncertain cycle of term appointments. 
Thereafter, while never assured that he will not fall 
casualty to some contingency of programmatic change 
in the institution or to some hard decision reflecting a 
financial crisis without available alternatives, he at least 
need not fear that he may be dispossessed of his position 
in the absence of demonstrated adequate cause pursuant 
to a hearing by his peers and the forms of fair review by 
the administration of his institution. So very far is this 
arrangement from being well calculated to establish life- 
time employment, to protect the incompetent, or to con- 
ceal the irresponsible, and so mild are its features in the 
encouragement of professional excellence and the pro- 
tection of academic freedom, I cannot think it needs 
defending at all. To the extent that it may, however, a 
defense was well and succinctly stated in the following 
resolution adopted by the 1971 Annual Meeting of the 
AAUP: 
Misconceptions of tenure are commonplace. For many 
groups and individuals tenure has become a conveniently 
simple explanation for what they perceive as a variety of 
educational ills. Tenure is not the cause of these ills, nor is 
it an incidental and self-serving privilege of the academic 
profession which may be casually dismissed. It is the foun- 
dation of intellectual freedom in American colleges and 
universities and has important but frequently overlooked 
benefits for society at large. 
Basically tenure insures that faculty members will not be 
dismissed without adequate cause and without due process. 
From the long list of academic freedom and tenure cases 
with which the Association has been confronted, it is evi- 
dent that many good teachers and scholars have been 
arbitrarily dismissed, and that many more would have been 
dismissed without the protection of tenure. In the absence 
of a manifestly more effective means for safeguarding intel- 
lectual freedom, attacks on tenure are irresponsible. There- 
fore, the Fifty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American 
Association of University Professors reaffirms the Associa- 
tion's commitment to tenure and insists upon its centrality 
as an enabling principle of American higher education. 
III. A Lengthy Postscript: Academic Freedom and the 
Nontenured Faculty 
While the need to enter a defense of tenure against 
the criticism that it is a shield for the incompetent and 
irresponsible may melt away once the actual conditions 
and terms of tenure have again been clarified, it may 
nonetheless be appropriate to add a postscript in acknowl- 
edgment of a very different kind of criticism, a criticism 
which finds serious fault with what is apparently the 
anomaly of tenure and the equal protection of academic 
freedom. In essence, the criticism is that insofar as the 
case for tenure stands or falls according to the measure of 
protection it yields for academic freedom, either it must 
be extended equally to all faculty members irrespective of 
their length of service, or withdrawn equally from all, 
(possibly then to be replaced by a uniform standard of 
academic due process for all, but without the invidious 
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distinction implied by the term of "tenure" itself) . If it is 
said that academic freedom is realistically secure for each 
person only to the extent that his professional status may 
not be placed in question without the observance of full 
academic due process, and if it is acknowledged that only 
those with tenure are entitled to full academic due 
process, then it necessarily follows that only those with 
tenure do in fact have academic freedom. On the other 
hand, if it is claimed that all members of a faculty are 
equally entitled to the free exercise of academic freedom, 
then it must be acknowledged either that tenure itself is 
not truly regarded as indispensable to the protection of 
that freedom or, if it is regarded as indispensable, that it 
must be provided for all alike. In short, the alleged equa- 
tion that academic freedom = no termination without full 
academic due process = tenure, proves too much or too 
little. The anomalous combination of mutually exclusive 
assertions, "equal academic freedom for all, but tenure 
only for some," displays all the unseemliness of a motto 
from Animal Farm: all teachers are equal in their aca- 
demic freedom, but some teachers are more equal than 
others (viz., those with tenure)! 
It will not do, as a response to this criticism, merely to 
point out that nontenured faculty members are equally 
entitled to full academic due process if sought to be dis- 
missed within the specified term of their appointment. 
I.e., it is not enough that newer appointees do in fact have 
"tenure" within their particular one-, two-, or three-year 
terms, and that any action to dismiss them within that 
term must be taken solely on the basis of adequate cause 
as demonstrated pursuant to full academic due process. 
The fact remains that the anxiety of prospective non- 
renewal may be seen to chill the appointee's academic 
freedom in a manner unequalled for those members of the 
faculty with tenure. 
Nor will it do quixotically to deny on second thought 
that tenure is really wholly unconcerned with academic 
freedom and that it is, rather, defended solely on the basis 
that it provides an appropriate degree of professional 
security for those of demonstrated excellence, i.e., those 
who weathered an uncertain career (and kept their 
mouths shut) as probationary appointees for as long as 
six years and were found on the basis of experience to 
warrant a conditional expression of institutional confi- 
dence in their continuing excellence. Other kinds of in- 
centives than tenure might satisfy the need for perquisites 
for the senior faculty, although possibly not so cheaply. 
Rather, it may help to dissolve the dilemma first to note 
that while there is a difference in the degree of academic 
due process which tenure provides as compared with that 
to which a person lacking tenure is entitled when con- 
fronted with the prospect that his term appointment may 
not be renewed, the difference is not at all one of "full" 
academic due process vis-a-vis "no" academic due 
process. Indeed, recent developments in the federal courts 
as well as the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards 
in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments 
provide for substantial due process in cases of proposed 
nonrenewal. The differences of degree between the two 
forms of academic due process are, in fact, essentially 
these: 
1. Proceedings to dismiss one with tenure must be ini- 
tiated by the employing institution, whereas proceedings to 
avoid termination of one lacking tenure who has received 
notice that nonrenewal is contemplated must be initiated by 
him; 
2. The burden of proving the existence of adequate 
cause is upon the institution in proceedings to dismiss one 
with tenure, whereas the burden is upon the individual con- 
testing notice of nonrenewal to establish at least a prima 
facie case either that reasons violative of academic freedom 
contributed to the proposed decision or that adequate con- 
sideration was not given to the merits of his reappointment; 
3. The degree of formality in the total procedure is 
somewhat heavier in the case of one with tenure faced with 
dismissal than one without tenure faced with nonrenewal. 
Recognizing, then, that those in probationary service 
are assured of full academic due process against the con- 
tingency of dismissal within any term of their appoint- 
ment and that they are also assured of at least minimal 
due process against the contingency even of nonrenewal, 
the disparity which remains as between themselves and 
those with tenure is clearly not so great as first it may 
have appeared. To the extent that it is nonetheless an 
important difference, especially as it may weigh upon the 
exercise of academic freedom, an explanation may rest 
largely in the following considerations. 
First, other things being even roughly equal, the degree 
of hardship to one threatened with dismissal after an 
extended commitment to a given discipline and a longer 
period of service in a particular institution is likely to be 
greater than to a younger person subject to nonrenewal 
after a more tentative commitment and a briefer period 
of service. To the extent that the degree of due process is 
appropriately graduated to the degree of hardship which 
may result from the decision in question, it is not difficult 
to understand on that basis alone why dismissal pro- 
ceedings are accompanied by a fuller complement of aca- 
demic due process than those concerning nonrenewal. 
Similarly, exactly to the extent that dismissal is more por- 
tentous than nonrenewal, the chilling effect on the indi- 
vidual's exercise of academic freedom may itself also be 
greater. Correspondingly, merely to insure that the same 
degree of academic freedom is assured equally to the 
individual faced with the threat of dismissal as to the one 
faced with the prospect of nonrenewal, a more deliberate 
form of academic due process may be required in the first 
case than in the second. 
Second, there is simply no basis to hold that the fact 
of one's first or second short-term appointment in teach- 
ing necessarily manifests an institutional presumption of 
excellence which it would thereafter be the burden of the 
institution to overthrow when contemplating nonrenewal 
at the end of the term. Surely no institution ought to be 
held to have made a judgment about the long-term pro- 
fessional excellence of a first-time appointee to its faculty 
in view of the fact that frequently the appointment will 
represent the individual's first experience in teaching and 
there will have been no reasonable opportunity in fact 
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so to determine his professional fitness. It is precisely the 
purpose of having a probationary period to enable the 
institution to resolve the doubt not previously resolved by 
actions of the individual with whom the burden neces- 
sarily rests. To extend the presumption of professional 
fitness back to the point of initial appointment is to be 
unfair toward the institution's capacity to make a judg- 
ment on the matter so early, with all the deleterious 
consequences of granting "instant tenure.'* Similarly, to 
extend the assurance of full academic due process back 
to the time of renewal of the first appointment is func- 
tionally exactly that, i.e., the establishment of instant 
tenure. 
Third, as initial appointments are usually not made 
with an adequate basis for assessing the individual's long- 
term excellence, there is correspondingly less reason to 
suspect that a decision not to renew such an appointment 
is made on grounds unrelated to a reasonable belief about 
that excellence. The same obviously cannot be said of 
those who have been found by lengthy experience to be 
satisfactory, however, and correspondingly their proposed 
termination creates a greater suspicion that ulterior rea- 
sons (i.e., reasons violative of academic freedom) are 
more likely to be operating, thereby providing an appro- 
priate reason for requiring fuller academic due process 
as a prerequisite to their termination. Stated in another 
way, as between the two groups a higher rate of non- 
renewal is less suspicious with respect to the first group 
than with respect to the second and, correspondingly, 
incurring the higher costs of more ponderous full aca- 
demic due process is less warranted by the uniform 
concern for academic freedom. 
Fourth, as it is normally to be expected that one may 
become more expert in his specialty the greater amount of 
time and experience he will have devoted to it, the more 
important it becomes not to permit the public value of 
his academic freedom to be circumscribed precisely as he 
becomes more likely to make an original contribution by 
what he proposes to do or to say. Correspondingly, the 
degree of full academic due process which protects his 
academic freedom is more nearly likely to be worth its 
cost than were it uniformly available to all irrespective of 
their length of experience. To this extent, the earlier 
suggestion that tenure does reflect an attitude that greater 
academic freedom is warranted for those with a longer 
commitment within their discipline than for those with 
a relatively new one, is not without a basis in fact. Some 
may well question whether the degree of difference is 
really justifiable on such a basis, of course, reasonably 
suggesting that what is lost to the younger teacher in lack 
of seasoning and familiarity with his subject is more than 
offset by his freshness, creativity, or lack of debilitating 
conventionality. Perhaps the debate may rest there, at 
least for the moment: not on whether tenure, with its 
assurance of full academic due process should exist at all, 
but rather on when it should appropriately be conferred! 
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